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Since China promulgated new minimum wage regulations in 2004, the frequency
and magnitude of changes in minimum wages have been substantial. This paper
uses county-level minimum wage data combined with urban household survey
micro-dataset from 16 representative provinces as a merged county-level panel to
estimate the employment effects of minimum wage changes in China over the
2002–2009 period. In contrast to the mixed results reported by previous studies
using provincial-level data, we present evidence that minimum wage changes led
to significant adverse effects on employment in the Eastern and Central regions of
China, and resulted in disemployment for females, young adults, and low-skilled
workers.
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Since China enacted its new minimum wage regulations in 2004, minimum wages have
sparked intense debate in the country. In China, supporters of minimum wages advocate
them as a way to assist individuals or families to achieve self-sufficiency and to protect
workers in low-paid occupations (Zhang and Deng 2005; Sun 2006). Minimum wages
can help reduce inequality by providing a wage floor (Zhang 2007; Jia and Zhang 2013).
In addition, higher labor cost may promote managerial efficiency and labor productivity,
inducing employers to invest in productivity-improving technology (Cooke 2005). Along
these lines, many Chinese scholars have argued in favor of the more proactive
increase of minimum wages (Du and Wang 2008; Ding 2009; Han and Wei 2011).
On the other hand, opponents argue that raising the minimum wage can decrease
the employment opportunities of low-wage workers and also lead to reduction in other
components of the compensation package (Xue 2004; Ping 2005; Gong 2009). Such
regulations can undermine enterprises’ dividend policies and reduce China’s compara-
tive advantage in the abundance of low-wage labor (Cheung 2004, 2010). For example,
rural–urban migrants (estimated 168 million workers in 2014 by the National Health
and Family Planning Commission) usually have very low pay and tend to work in the
uncovered sectors (Chan 2001; Ye 2005).1
The minimum wage policy is contentious also because its effects on employment
cannot be easily estimated. However, in recently years the new policy in China has
generated a lot of variation that is useful in identifying the effects of minimum wages.
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extended coverage to self-employed and part-time workers, and quintupled the penalties
for violation or noncompliance. The new regulations were put into effect in March 2004,
leading to frequent and substantial increases in minimum wages in the subsequent years.
These large variations both across jurisdictions and over time facilitate our estimation of
minimum wage effects on employment in China.
Figure 1 shows the nominal and real minimum wage (monthly average) in China
from 1995 to 2012 as well as those corresponding to the provinces that raised the
minimum wages for each year, along with its moving average over the same period.2
Between 1995 and 2003, the average nominal minimum wage increased steadily from
169 RMB to 301 RMB, amounting to a 78% growth in 9 years. However, since China
implemented the new minimum wage regulations in 2004, the nominal minimum wage
has increased even more rapidly by over 200%, reaching 944 RMB in 2012.3 The real
minimum wage grew at a slower pace before 2004 and began to rise thereafter. In
particular, Fig. 2 shows the minimum-to-average wage ratio started to increase in 2004
for the three regions and the whole country, implying that the 2004 policy has induced
an increase in the bite of the minimum wage. Furthermore, as shown by the moving
average curve in Fig. 1, there is an apparent rise after 2004 in the number of provinces
that raised the minimum wage standards, indicating that minimum wage adjustments
had become more frequent after that year.
How did this regulatory environment affect labor market outcomes in China? More
specifically, did changes in the minimum wage have any impact on employment in the
Chinese labor market? Although there is an enormous literature documenting numerous
aspects of minimum wages and their role in the labor market, most studies have been
conducted in the high-income economies such as the U.S., U.K., and Canada; even there,
no consensus has been reached on the magnitude of an effect of minimum wages on
employment.4Fig. 1 Minimum wages in China, 1995–2012. Nominal minimum wages have been adjusted for inflation
and expressed in 2000 RMB
Fig. 2 Minimum-to-average wage ratios in China, by region. The East includes Liaoning, Beijing, Shandong,
Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Guangdong; the Central region includes Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, and
Jiangxi; and the West includes Gansu, Chongqing, Sichuan, and Yunnan
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urban household survey microdata in China. Empirically speaking, there are at least
three challenges involved in measuring the employment effects of Chinese minimum
wages. First, provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions5 in China have
considerable autonomy and flexibility in setting their minimum wages according to local
conditions. There are often at least 3 or 4 levels of minimum wage standards applicable to
various counties in most provinces. The fact that each county is responsible for selecting
its own minimum wage standards implies that the county- or city-level minimum wage
data containing the relevant information on the dates and the extent of minimum wage
increases are not readily available.6 Second, omission and endogeneity of important
variables (such as the timing of decisions to adjust minimum wage standards) make it
difficult to separate causal effects from effects due to other unobserved confounding
factors.7 Third, in China, it remains difficult to find microdata that can be both plausibly
representative of the population and also influenced by minimum wage increases. Further-
more, some provinces, such as Beijing and Shanghai, do not include social security
payments and housing provident funds as part of wages as part of the minimum wages. In
effect, their actual minimum wages are higher on a comparable basis.8
In this paper, we first assess whether and the extent to which minimum wage changes
affected the Chinese labor market by measuring the effect of the minimum wage on
employment. To do so, we begin by analyzing the labor market responses to changes in
minimum wage standards using panel data regressions. The most distinctive feature of
our data—crucial for our research design—is the combination of a large county-level
panel data of minimum wages, which covers all counties (over 2000 counties each year) in
China, with a urban household survey micro-dataset of 16 representative provinces
between 2002 and 2009.9 We use the urban household surveys to construct the county-
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minimum wage data. The use of county-level data rather than provincial level data
allows for a more accurate measurement of the relevant minimum wage and labor
market conditions, providing more variation in detecting the effects of minimum
wages on employment in China. In particular, we also attempt to evaluate the
effects on subgroups of the population, especially those who are at risk of being
affected by a minimum wage increase, such as young adults, female and low-skilled
workers.
Our regressions based on county-level panel data reveal a significant disemployment
effects of minimum wages on young adults (age 15–29) between 2004 and 2009
nationwide—the estimated elasticity of the sum of current and lagged effects is −.259.
Please note, for expositional convenience, we refer to the minimum wage relative to the
average wage as the minimum wage in all discussion of the empirical results. Our results
are reported for such normalized measure. Furthermore, we find that the previous
year’s minimum wage has the largest adverse effect on the employment of at-risk
groups, which as defined as workers whose monthly wages are between the old
and new minimum wage standards. We treated it as a simple zero–one dummy
variable as the young adults group. As such the wages and employment of this at-
risk group are most likely to be affected by the changes in minimum wages. As
expected, the sum of the current and lagged effects yields estimated elasticities in
the range of −.465 to −.552 over the same period.
Several studies on the employment effects of minimum wages in China found mixed
results, and the results for different regions are often opposite to one another. For
example, using provincial level data Ni et al. (2011) focused on all employees and found
some negative effects in the more prosperous and rapidly growing East region, and some
positive effects in the developing Central region and less developed Western regions over
the 2000–2005 period. In contrast, Wang and Gunderson (2011) used 2000–2007 provin-
cial data of rural migrants and found no adverse effects and in fact a positive employment
effect in state-owned enterprises in the East and negative effects in the Central and
Western regions. The discrepancies between these studies may be explained in part by the
fact that the employment effects of minimum wage increases on different target groups
tend to differ. By examining the effects on several subgroups, our estimates seem to
be consistent with their findings—we find that, similar to Ni et al. (2011), the
current minimum wage has a significantly negative effect on all employees in
the East and a one-year lagged positive (though statistically insignificant) effect in
the Western region in 2004–2009. In contrast, using rural migrants as the target group,
we find that the current minimum wage has an adverse and significant effect in the West
and a positive (though statistically insignificant) effect in the East over the same period
studied in Wang and Gunderson (2011).10
Finally, we investigate the impact of the minimum wage on the employment of workers
by skill level. In theory, low-skilled workers are relatively vulnerable to job loss when
facing minimum wage increases. As anticipated, our county-level panel data analysis
shows that the current minimum wage has an adverse, though perhaps mild, effect on the
employment of low-skilled workers (defined as those with a high school diploma or
below), the estimated elasticites of the current effect are in the range of −.054 to −.080 for
the entire sample, −0.070 for the East region, and −0.070 to −0.077 for the Central region.
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(defined those with a college diploma or above).
2 Minimum wages in China
Prior to 1994, China had no minimum wage law. In 1984, the country started by
acknowledging the 1928 “Minimum Wage Treaty” of the International Labour
Organization (ILO) (Su 1993). Due to sluggish wage growth and high inflation in
the late 1980s, Zhuhai in Guangdong Province first implemented its local mini-
mum wage regulations, followed by Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Jiangmen in 1989.
It was not until the eruption of private enterprises in 1992 when labor disputes
became frequent that the Chinese Central Government began to consider mini-
mum wage legislation (Yang 2006). In 1993, China issued its first national mini-
mum wage regulations, and in July 1994, they were written into China’s new
version of the Labor Law.
The 1994 legislation required that all employers pay wages no less than the local
minimum wage. All provincial, autonomous-region, and municipal governments should
set their minimum wages according to five principles and report them to the State
Council of the Central Government. Specifically, the five principles stipulated that the
setting and adjustment of the local minimum wage should synthetically consider the
lowest living expenses of workers and the average number of dependents they support,
local average wages, labor productivity, local employment, and levels of economic
development across regions. These conditions provided considerable flexibility for
provinces in setting minimum wage standards, according to economic development
principles and the need to attract foreign investment (Frost 2002; Wang and Gunderson
2011). By December 1994, 7 of 31 provinces had set their own minimum wages. By the
end of 1995, the number increased to 24.
In the early 2000s, the slow increase of minimum wages along with growing concerns
for uncovered/disadvantaged workers prompted the Chinese government to consider
new minimum wage regulations. In December 2003, the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security passed “The Minimum Wage Regulations” and promulgated the new law in
January 2004. The main features of this law involved extending coverage to state-
owned, private enterprises, private non-enterprise units, and employees in self-
employed businesses. In particular, the new law established two types of minimum
wages: a monthly minimum wage applied to fulltime workers and an hourly minimum
wage applied to non-fulltime workers. Importantly, the minimum wage standards
were set and adjusted jointly by the local government, trade union, and enterprise
confederation of each province. The draft would then be submitted to the Ministry
of Labour and Social Security for review. The Ministry would then ask for opinions
from the All China Federation of Trade Unions and the China Enterprise Confederation.
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security can request a revision within 14 days after
receiving the proposed draft. If no revision request is brought up after the 14-day period,
the proposed new minimum wage program is considered to be passed.
In addition, the new regulation required local governments to renew minimum wage
standards at least once every two years, and penalties for violation were increased from
20 to 100% of the owed wages to 100–500% of the owed wages.11 Employers cannot
include subsidies such as overtime pay or canteen allowances, nor travel subsidies, as
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effect on March 1st, 2004 and led to substantial increases in minimum wages.3 Data and research design
The data collection and research design were motivated by an attempt to estimate the
effect of minimum wages on employment and address some of the aforementioned
empirical challenges. The purpose of data collection was to obtain information on the
minimum wage at the county level over a long time span, with a panel structure
allowing for the use of fixed time and county effects to eliminate omitted variable bias
arising from unobserved variables that are constant over time and across counties. The
wage sample needed to be at the individual level to allow the distribution of minimum
wage workers—in each geographic region, age cohort, skill level, and industry—to be
estimated. For these reasons, we sought to collect information on counties that were
potentially affected over as many years as possible.
3.1 Data
Our study uses two primary data sources: the annual Urban Household Survey (UHS)
from 2002 to 2009 and minimum wage data collected at the county level (6-digit code)
between 1994 and 2012. The UHS is a continuous, large-scale social-economic survey
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) to study the living
conditions and standard of urban households, which covers agricultural and non-
agricultural residents or non-residents who live in the city for at least 6 months and
migrant households with local residency. Using survey sampling techniques and daily
accounting methods, the UHS collects quarterly data from households in all 31
provinces of Mainland China. Starting late December, survey teams in each province
and autonomous region are required to verify and then upload the aggregated annual
data to the Division of City Socio-economic Survey of NBS via intranet by January 10th
of the following year. The UHS contains rich arrays of household information, such as
income and consumption expenditure; demographic characteristics; work and employ-
ment; housing; other family-related matters; and county identifiers (6-digit code).
Figure 3 depicts the 16 provinces (the maximum number of provinces accessible to
the researchers) used to study the impact of minimum wages on the Chinese labor
market. We divide the 31 jurisdictions into three regions following the NBS: the more
prosperous and rapidly growing East region, the developing Central region and the less
developed and more slowly growing West region. The open-door policy and economic
reforms first started in the Eastern coastal regions. It is well documented (see (Cai
and Wang 2005; Wang and Gunderson 2012)) that the labor market in the Eastern
region is well developed and mimics a competitive labor market. As such, the
external shock of a minimum wage increase with strong enforcement is expected
to have significant adverse effects on employment, especially for those who are
at-risk (youth, females, unskilled, migrants, etc.).
In contrast, the labor market in the Central and Western regions is relatively under-
developed where there is still plenty supply of unskilled labor. In a developing country like
China, enforcement of the minimum wage could be an important issue that affects the
reliability of our results (Khamis 2013). Hence, we first examine the differences in
Fig. 3 Panel data with minimum wages in Mainland China. The panel data used in the analysis include 16
provinces (darker areas in the map) covering three regions in Mainland China. The East includes Liaoning,
Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Guangdong; the Central region includes Heilongjiang, Shanxi,
Henan, Anhui, Hubei, and Jiangxi; and the West includes Gansu, Chongqing, Sichuan, and Yunnan
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enforcement as the ratio of the number of workers earning almost exactly at the ongoing
minimum wage (between the exact minimum wage and 1.1 times the minimum wage)
divided by number of workers earning less than the minimum wage.12 We show the
ratio across provinces and over time in Fig. 4.
Figure 4 illustrates the enforcement of the minimum wage across our 16 sample
provinces between 2002 and 2009. Overall, we find that enforcement increases over
time in most provinces, especially after 2004 and particularly in the East part of
China (Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Guangdong and Liaoning). On the
other hand, provinces in the West such as Yunnan and Sichuan as well as Henan in the
Central do not show increases in enforcement over the period. Our estimated effects of
the minimum wage enforcement on wages and employment (Additional file 1: Tables S3
and S4) show that the enforcement has the largest significant effect on wages and employ-
ment in the East, a relatively smaller effect in the Central, and no effect in the West. For
example, the estimates of the enforcement on wages for the young adults (specification 2
in Additional file 1: Table S3) are .484 and .226 in the East and Central, respectively; for
the same group, the estimates of the enforcement on employment are −.313 and −.499 in
the East and Central, respectively (specification 2 in Additional file 1: Table S4).
As shown in Fig. 3, the data for the Eastern region are represented by darker areas,
which include two major municipalities, Beijing and Shanghai, and four economically
Fig. 4 Enforcement of the minimum wage across provinces, 2002–2009. The vertical axis shows enforcement,
which is defined as the number of minimum wage workers divided by the number of workers earning less
than the minimum wage. Minimum wage workers earn wages between the exact minimum wage and 1.1
times the minimum wage. The East includes Liaoning, Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Guangdong;
the Central region includes Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, and Jiangxi; and the West includes
Gansu, Chongqing, Sichuan, and Yunnan
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includes six developing provinces, namely, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Shanxi,
which are where most migrants come from. Finally, the Western region covers the one
municipality, Chongqing, and three less developed provinces: Gansu, Sichuan, and
Yunnan. Collectively, our 16-province sample contains 65% of the total population in
China, covering 60% of the counties in the country.13 To check the representativeness
of our 16 sample provinces, we compare the descriptive statistics and some key vari-
ables from the UHS with those from the 2005 Census in Section 4.5.2. in which we
show that the numbers for all 31 provinces and 16 provinces are close, indicating that
the use of 16-province UHS sample is representative.
We also need to collect accurate minimum wage data for each county. As discussed,
provinces in China have considerable autonomy and flexibility in setting their mini-
mum wage standards according to local economic conditions, which creates several
levels of standards across counties within the same province. Moreover, the adjustment
date of a county’s new minimum wage standard can also differ from its geographically
contiguous neighbors within the same province, making the estimation of minimum
wage effects more challenging. To effectively address this issue, we collected our own
minimum wage data from every local government website and carefully recorded the
minimum wage information for approximately 2,000 counties every year from 1994 to
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hourly minimum wages for part-time employees, the effective dates of the minimum
wage standards and the extent to which social security payments and/or housing
provident funds were included as part of the minimum wage calculations to assure that
they are on a comparable basis.
We then merge the minimum wage data into the UHS, a 16-province dataset that
contains individual/household socio-economic information over the 2002–2009 period.
To calculate average wages, we keep only salaried workers who work for 12 months and
then divide their annual wages by 12 to obtain monthly wages for each year.14 We present
a brief summary of the minimum wage data used in our main analysis for the post new
minimum wage regulations (2004) period in Table 1. Columns (1), (2), and (3) correspond
to the mean of the monthly minimum wages, the standard deviation, and the number of
counties for the three regions as well as the 16 provinces in 2004, respectively.15 When
calculating the mean minimum wage, we use the time-weighted average method as
suggested by Rama (2001).16 The mean minimum wage has been adjusted for inflation
and converted into 2005 RMB using the provincial urban resident CPI. The last row
reports the mean of the minimum wages of all provinces, their standard deviations, and
the total number of counties that raised minimum wages for each year.
Table 1 reveals several important patterns. First, when calculated at the county level,
the mean nominal minimum wage increased by 80% (from 310 RMB to 562 RMB)
between 2004 and 2009 for all counties as a whole.17 Second, the Eastern region has
the highest minimum wage, with an average of 522 RMB per month in this period,
followed by the West (436 RMB) and the Central region (424 RMB). Interestingly,
minimum wages of the three regions have similar annual growth rates of around 13%.18
Third, minimum wage hikes sometimes occurred more than once in a year. For
example, Beijing increased its minimum wages first in January and then July of 2004,
and Jiangsu raised its standards in both April and July of 2008.
We defined employment as working-age population between the ages of 15 and 64
who are employed in the civilian labor force, report positive annual earnings, are not
self-employed, and not enrolled in school. Individuals who work in agricultural produc-
tion or services, farming, forestry, fishing, and ranching industries are also excluded
(Neumark and Wascher 1992). Sampling weights are applied in all calculations.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the two key variables, the minimum-to-
average wage ratio and the employment-to-population ratio, from 2004 to 2009. Our
population is constructed by including all persons in the same demographic group being
examined. The second and third rows of the table show that male workers have approxi-
mately 10 percentage points lower minimum-to-average-wage ratios and 15 percentage
points higher employment-to-population ratios than females, suggesting that Chinese
female workers are comparatively disadvantaged in the labor market relative to their male
counterparts.19 As anticipated, the more prosperous Eastern region has the lowest
minimum-to-average-wage ratio (.276) and the highest employment-to-population ratio
(.607) among three regions.20
A large body of empirical evidence from minimum wage studies has consistently
found that minimum wages have a greater impact on young and low-skilled workers,
especially teenagers. Compared to older workers, young workers, who are often
equipped with less human capital, are more likely to earn the minimum wage. Table 2
Table 1 Means and standard deviations of the minimum wage using county level information: by region and by province, 2004–2009
Province 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
MW S.D. Obs. MW S.D. Obs. MW S.D. Obs. MW S.D. Obs. MW S.D. Obs. MW S.D. Obs.
East
Beijing 509.5 .0 2 562.5 .0 2 611.8 .0 2 665.4 .0 2 735.4 .0 2 820.1 .0 2
Shanghai 590.3 .0 2 662.5 .0 2 712.1 .0 2 757.7 .0 2 894.0 .0 2 984.2 .0 2
Liaoning 282.3 46.0 96 361.9 36.6 96 405.5 41.2 96 465.8 48.7 96 550.1 59.9 97 587.8 63.2 97
Shandong 348.4 35.2 129 440.9 50.0 129 454.6 53.5 129 476.2 66.3 129 571.9 75.6 129 609.9 80.6 129
Jiangsu 416.2 59.9 66 457.6 66.8 66 517.9 70.4 66 591.0 78.0 75 647.8 88.1 75 694.4 94.7 75
Guangdong 361.2 59.9 104 442.1 80.6 104 475.0 84.9 104 516.6 88.5 104 574.3 88.2 104 636.1 98.2 104
All East 349.1 68.5 339 426.7 72.1 399 460.6 76.0 399 507.4 86.5 408 583.6 87.6 409 629.7 95.7 409
Central
Heilongjiang 282.0 28.1 30 287.8 28.7 30 384.0 45.7 30 418.0 53.6 30 456.0 58.6 30 486.3 62.5 30
Anhui 304.6 11.7 86 330.7 17.1 86 350.1 19.1 86 400.7 27.1 86 420.4 29.2 86 448.3 31.2 86
Jiangxi 246.7 6.6 99 317.7 8.9 100 328.9 9.4 100 427.5 15.2 100 460.3 21.8 100 490.9 23.3 100
Shanxi 348.2 21.8 119 445.4 22.3 119 454.2 22.4 119 476.3 21.6 119 536.6 22.8 119 642.5 28.6 119
Hubei 271.9 34.9 89 320.6 36.8 89 330.2 37.2 89 402.4 39.1 89 453.4 45.6 89 541.5 58.5 89
Henan 251.5 15.5 127 278.5 17.0 127 345.0 27.9 127 371.1 25.7 127 477.2 42.5 127 509.0 45.3 127
All Central 284.8 43.6 550 337.1 63.8 551 366.2 54.7 551 416.3 46.3 551 473.1 51.7 551 529.1 77.0 551
West
Gansu 298.2 8.5 87 304.4 8.7 87 322.1 16.3 87 344.6 35.1 87 471.6 36.3 87 549.4 39.2 87
Chongqing 334.7 21.7 42 365.7 24.6 42 409.0 30.1 42 477.8 39.8 42 554.8 44.5 42 591.7 47.4 42
Sichuan 295.4 32.1 50 352.2 41.9 50 392.2 43.8 50 425.0 42.3 181 477.9 53.0 181 509.7 56.5 181
Yunnan 297.5 18.0 138 365.2 23.4 138 403.6 23.4 138 427.0 22.8 138 527.2 31.5 138 562.3 33.6 138
All West 302.3 23.3 317 346.5 36.1 317 380.1 45.0 317 414.9 51.8 448 499.1 52.3 448 541.3 54.1 448
All Provinces 309.5 56.7 1266 367.7 73.1 1267 399.4 73.3 1267 442.3 74.8 1407 513.5 79.2 1408 562.2 88.3 1408













Table 2 Summary statistics, 2004–2009
Variable Minimum/Average wage Employment/Population
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
All 100.0 .291 .094 .595 .072
Gender
Male 55.3 .256 .089 .673 .074
Female 44.7 .354 .115 .520 .087
Region
East 54.1 .276 .099 .607 .068
Central 32.9 .298 .086 .586 .074
West 13.0 .335 .074 .572 .071
Age cohort
Age 15–29 13.1 .392 .167 .359 .129
Age 30–39 30.7 .295 .107 .810 .096
Age 40–49 35.8 .283 .096 .802 .094
Age 50–64 20.3 .278 .128 .415 .110
Educational attainment
Elementary school or below 2.1 .593 .505 .226 .139
Junior high school 20.7 .433 .135 .447 .101
High school 25.2 .355 .107 .566 .098
Vocational school 12.0 .314 .112 .673 .131
Junior college 24.8 .246 .086 .801 .092
College or above 15.2 .183 .085 .797 .120
Industry
Mining 2.3 .291 .201 – –
Manufacturing 21.6 .346 .134 – –
Power production and supply 3.4 .248 .142 – –
Construction 3.2 .352 .211 – –
Transportation and postal service 7.6 .288 .132 – –
Information technology 2.4 .292 .314 – –
Wholesales and retail sales 9.9 .471 .197 – –
Hotel and restaurant 2.7 .498 .333 – –
Banking and finance 2.9 .234 .157 – –
Real estate 1.9 .355 .353 – –
Leasing and commercial service 1.6 .371 .313 – –
Scientific research 2.1 .204 .175 – –
Environment and public facility 1.3 .311 .212 – –
Housekeeping 9.6 .509 .213 – –
Education 7.2 .237 .101 – –
Health care 4.8 .265 .170 – –
Sports and entertainment 1.8 .280 .226 – –
Public service 13.9 .245 .094 – –
Total observations 620,321
The average wage is calculated as the mean wage in each category. Because age cohort 16–19 and 20–24 only account
for .17 percent and 3.6 percent of total observations, respectively, we choose the first age cohort to be age 16–29
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2004–2009 period. Indeed, we find that young Chinese workers aged 15 to 29 have the
highest minimum-to-average-wage ratio (.392), at least 10 percentage points higher
than those of other age cohorts. For workers with different levels of skills, the evidence
demonstrates that as the skill level increases, the minimum-to-average-wage ratio
decreases quickly—dropping continuously from .389 for high school education or
below to .183 for college or above education.
Table 2 also presents the minimum-to-average-wage ratio by industry. The manufac-
turing sector contains the largest share (21.6%) of workers in our sample; the public
service sector is the second-largest (13.9%); and the third and the fourth sectors are
wholesale and retail sales trade (9.9%) and housekeeping (9.6%), respectively. As to the
minimum-to-average-wage ratios, unsurprisingly, we find that the housekeeping sector
has the highest ratio (.509) among all industries, followed by the hotel and restaurant
sector (.498) and wholesale and retail sales trade (.471).
We also provide a summary of the characteristics of workers who earn the minimum
wage as well as less/more than the minimum wage over 2004–2009 in Table 3. The first
row of Table 3 shows that approximately 5.62% of all workers earned less than the
minimum wage and 3.28% earned just the minimum.21 Among those who earned the
exact minimum wage or less than the minimum wage, 63.84 and 61.52% are females,
respectively. Furthermore, the minimum-to-average-wage ratio of workers receiving
less than the minimum wage is 2.52, suggesting that these disadvantaged workers earn
a wage that is only approximately one-quarter of the official standard.
3.2 Research design
Our empirical strategy is to estimate the impact of minimum wages on the employment
of potentially affected workers. As noted in Section 1, nearly all existing studies on
minimum wages in China use aggregated data (from the year books) at the provincial
level and tend to find mixed results, implying that convincing evidence of the employ-
ment effects has not yet been established. Our study takes advantage of household
survey data and a more accurate measure of minimum wages at the county level. This
in turn allows us to calculate the dependent variable—the employment-to-population
ratio—at the county level, which contains more variation and information on local
conditions. These unique features of our data provide us an opportunity to generate
more reliable estimates of the employment effects of minimum wages in China.
First, we estimate the effect of minimum wages on average wages to see whether
changes in the minimum wage indeed affect the observed wages of the groups being
examined in our analysis. We then estimate a standard set of equations as used in
Neumark (2001); Campolieti et al. (2006); Wang and Gunderson (2011).22
Our estimation equations for the wage and employment effects are as follows:
Wi;t ¼ η0 þ η1MWLi;t þ η2MWLi;t−1 þ Xi;tθ þ Y tμþ Ciτ þ εi;t ; ð1Þ
Ei;t ¼ α0 þ α1MWi;t þ α2MWi;t−1 þ Xi;tβþ Y tγ þ Ciδ þ ei;t; ð2Þ
where Wi,t is the log of the average wage variable for county i in year t; MWLi,t and
MWLi,t−1 are the log of minimum wage variables (in level) for county i in year t and
year t-1, respectively. Ei,t is the log of employment variable (employment-to-population
Table 3 Characteristics of workers earning the minimum wage, 2004–2009
Variable Less than minimum Minimum Above minimum
Percent of total (%) 5.62 3.28 91.09
Percent of female (%) 61.52 63.84 42.99
Minimum/Average wage 2.52 1.00 .35
(4.66) (.06) (.20)
Region (%)
East 5.33 3.27 91.40
Central 5.46 2.88 91.66
West 7.26 4.36 88.38
Age
Age 15–29 9.53 4.30 86.17
Age 30–39 4.73 2.84 92.43
Age 40–49 4.90 3.26 91.83
Age 50–64 5.73 3.33 90.94
Educational attainment
Elementary school or below 15.75 9.41 74.84
Junior high school 9.43 6.00 84.57
High school 6.60 3.99 89.40
Vocational school 4.89 2.85 92.26
Junior college 3.08 1.50 95.43
College or above 2.17 .82 97.01
Industry
Mining 3.10 1.88 95.02
Manufacturing 5.50 3.30 91.20
Power production and supply 2.47 1.37 96.16
Construction 5.78 3.04 91.17
Transportation and postal service 4.00 2.10 93.90
Information technology 5.42 2.27 92.31
Wholesales and retail sales 10.46 6.30 83.24
Hotel and restaurant 9.98 6.52 83.50
Banking and finance 2.74 1.21 96.04
Real estate 5.46 3.05 91.49
Leasing and commercial service 6.37 3.16 90.46
Scientific research 2.20 .84 96.96
Environment and public facility 3.89 2.23 93.87
Housekeeping 12.63 7.58 79.79
Education 2.74 1.39 95.87
Health care 3.57 1.74 94.69
Sports and entertainment 4.10 1.77 94.13
Public service 2.41 1.77 95.82
Standard deviations are in parentheses. There are 620,321 observations in this period. “Less than the Minimum” are
workers earning wages at or below 90 percent of the minimum wage. Minimum wage workers earn wages above 90
percent and up to 110 percent of the minimum wage. Above minimum wage workers earn wages above 110 percent of
the minimum wage
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Fang and Lin IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:22 Page 14 of 30ratio) of the relevant group e.g., young adult workers employed in urban (county) units
divided by the urban working age population (15–64) for county i in year t; MWi,t and
MWi,t−1 are the log of minimum wage index variables (minimum-to-average-wage ra-
tio) for county i in year t and year t-1, respectively. We include MWi,t−1 in the equation
to allow a lagged effect of minimum wages to occur as suggested by Burkhauser et al.
(2000); X is a set of control variables to capture aggregate business cycle effects; Yt is a
set of fixed year effects; and Ci is a set of fixed county effects. The disturbance terms ɛ
and e are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and orthogonal to the independent
variables.
To address the potential bias from misspecification and factors that may affect labor
demand, we include several control variables in the estimation equations. First, the
county GDP per capita and CPI (at city level) capture aggregate business cycle effects
and controls for the Great Recession. Second, county-level foreign direct investment
(FDI) is used to control for the possibility that provinces may restrain minimum wage
increases to attract foreign investment (Frost 2002) and other factors that may affect
the relative labor demand for workers with different skills. We controlled for such local
condition variables as they are potential determinants of minimum wage decisions.4 Empirical results and discussion
4.1 Minimum wage effects across regions
We first present estimates of minimum wage effects on the wages of young adults, at-
risk groups, and the entire sample for the East, Central, West regions, and all regions
in Table 4. In each region, we estimate Eq. (1) using a fixed-effects model with both
fixed year and county effects. All regressions are appropriately weighted by the size of
the population in each county and adjust the weight to be the size for the groups such
as age, gender, etc.
Our results show that, for each of the three groups, the current year minimum wage
has a statistically significant and positive effect on the average wage for the East, Cen-
tral, and all regions over 2004–2009. We also find positive but milder effects of the
one-year lagged minimum wage variable on the average wage nationwide. However, we
do not find any significant wage effect in the Western region. In short, we show that
minimum wage changes in the East, Central, and all regions have positively affected the
observed wages of young adults, at-risk groups, and the entire sample of workers.23
Next, using Eq. (2), we estimate the effect of the minimum wage on employment for
young adults, at-risk groups, and the entire sample for the East, Central, West regions,
and all regions respectively, and present the results in Table 5. We report the results of
two estimation equations for each of the three groups: the first equation uses the mini-
mum wage of the current year t (MWi,t) and the previous year t-1 (MWi,t−1) only, while
the second equation further controls for CPI (city level), county GDP per capita, and
county FDI (shown as Other controls in the table).
The first and second columns of Table 5 report the estimates with cluster-robust
standard errors at the county level in parentheses for young adults and at-risk groups
across different regions using Eq. (2), while in the third column, we report estimates of
the entire sample for comparison. The significance of our results is compelling: for the
entire country, we find negative effects of the current and lagged minimum wage on
Table 4 Estimates of minimum wage effects on wages
Dependent variable: log (Wages) Young adults (Age 15–29) At-risk group Entire sample
Independent variables (log) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
A. All Regions
MW level, current year .782*** .429*** .873*** .883*** .545*** .300***
(.077) (.084) (.034) (.039) (.044) (.050)
MW level, lagged 1 year .360*** .083* .100*** .108*** .339*** .171***
(.076) (.042) (.033) (.036) (.042) (.046)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .511 .558 .916 .936 .626 .659
Number of observations 3,894 3,894 3,372 3,372 3,966 3,966
B. East
MW level, current year 1.434*** .890*** .861*** .905*** .666*** .229***
(.114) (.141) (.097) (.055) (.071) (.075)
MW level, lagged 1 year .184 .037 .115** .095* .449*** .186***
(.117) (.124) (.055) (.050) (.060) (.071)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .676 .700 .933 .934 .698 .718
Number of counties 1,716 1,716 1,518 1,518 1,734 1,734
C. Central
MW level, current year .257** .080* .874*** .884*** .289*** .256***
(.118) (.045) (.055) (.061) (.063) (.068)
MW level, lagged 1 year .241** .205* .108** .116* .078 .009
(.122) (.112) (.055) (.062) (.067) (.069)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .306 .359 .854 .883 .515 .552
Number of counties 1,638 1,638 1,380 1,380 1,674 1,674
D. West
MW level, current year .601 .328 1.014 .837 .523 .450
(.387) (.517) (.873) (.867) (.377) (.399)
MW level, lagged 1 year .233 .477 .022 .102 .087 .040
(.350) (.480) (.091) (.188) (.233) (.348)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .330 .352 .870 .889 .348 .356
Number of counties 540 540 474 474 558 558
Cluster-robust standard errors at the county level are in parentheses. All variables in the table are at the county level,
except that CPI is at the city level. Young adults are defined as workers who are 15–29 years old. At-risk groups are
workers whose monthly wages are between the old and new minimum wage standards. Each estimation has controlled
for year and county fixed effects
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **at the 5 percent level; *at the 10 percent level
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effects are in the range of −.062 to −.088 and −.136 to −.156, respectively. For the entire
sample of individuals, the estimated elasticities for the current and lagged effects are in
the range of −.045 to −.055 and −.028 to −.031, respectively.24
In the more developed and prosperous East China, covering large urban centers such
as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, the minimum wage has been an important policy
tool as China makes the critical transition into a market economy. Consequently, the
Table 5 Estimates of minimum wage effects on the employment-to-population ratio
Dependent variable: log
(Employment/Population)
Young adults (Age 15–29) At-risk group Entire sample
Independent variables (log) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
A. All Regions
MW, current year −.088** −.062 −.213* −.200 −.055*** −.045**
(.042) (.043) (.128) (.129) (.018) (.018)
MW, lagged 1 year −.156*** −.136*** −.340*** −.265*** −.031*** −.028**
(.040) (.042) (.102) (.102) (.012) (.011)
MW, sum current and lagged −.244*** −.198*** −.552*** −.465** −.086*** −.073***
(.055) (.058) (.192) (.195) (.019) (.019)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .144 .218 .024 .025 .079 .091
Number of counties per year 649 649 562 562 661 661
Average obs. per county per year 270 270 170 170 1658 1658
B. East
MW, current year −.234*** −.154** −.201 −.213 −.068*** −.067**
(.047) (.070) (.219) (.220) (.025) (.027)
MW, lagged 1 year −.100** −.046 −.322** −.310** −.018 −.015
(.048) (.057) (.128) (.124) (.020) (.020)
MW, sum current and lagged −.334*** −.201** −.523* −.523* −.086*** −.082***
(.043) (.097) (.307) (.304) (.020) (.025)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .213 .223 .041 .056 .084 .085
Number of counties per year 286 286 253 253 289 289
Average obs. per county per year 329 329 180 180 1917 1917
C. Central
MW, current year −.032 −.034 −.297 −.272 −.039 −.039
(.068) (.070) (.181) (.177) (.025) (.026)
MW, lagged 1 year −.216*** −.216*** −.336* −.310* −.041*** −.042***
(.061) (.061) (.174) (.184) (.015) (.014)
MW, sum current and lagged −.248*** −.250*** −.632** −.582* −.080*** −.081***
(.090) (.093) (.297) (.302) (.030) (.031)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .129 .151 .031 .043 .094 .133
Number of counties per year 273 273 230 230 279 279
Average obs. per county per year 214 214 154 154 1385 1385
D. West
MW, current year .088 −.037 .018 .022 −.096 −.069
(.114) (.106) (.208) (.223) (.063) (.064)
MW, lagged 1 year .124 −.153 .000 .124 .055 −.005
(.107) (.110) (.258) (.276) (.075) (.043)
MW, sum current and lagged .212 −.191 .018 .146 −.041 −.074
(.191) (.161) (.321) (.384) (.080) (.096)
Fang and Lin IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:22 Page 16 of 30
Table 5 Estimates of minimum wage effects on the employment-to-population ratio (Continued)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .153 .169 .014 .051 .015 .043
Number of counties per year 90 90 79 79 93 93
Average obs. per county per year 250 250 181 181 1673 1673
Cluster-robust standard errors at the county level are in parentheses. All variables in the table are at the county level,
except that CPI is at the city level. At-risk groups are workers whose monthly wages are between the old and new
minimum wage standards. Among young adults, less than 3 percent are at-risk groups in each region; likewise, among
at-risk group, less than 3 percent are young adults in each region. Each estimation has controlled for year and county
fixed effects
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **at the 5 percent level; *at the 10 percent level
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impact of minimum wages on employment can be evident. Indeed, this is consistent
with our results in Table 5. Our estimates indicate that minimum wage increases in the
Eastern region have a statistically significant adverse impact on employment with elasti-
cities ranging from −.154 to −.234 and a lagged adverse effect with an elasticity of
−.046 to −.100 for young adults. Furthermore, we find a large and negative one-year
lagged minimum wage effect on the employment for the at-risk groups—the estimated
elasticity for the lagged effect is in the range of −.310 to −.322. The current minimum
wage effects are negative but statistically insignificant.
In the developing Central region, we also find that one-year lagged minimum wages
have a strong negative employment effect on young adults, at-risk groups, and the
entire working population. For the entire working population in the Central region, the
elasticity is in the range of −.041 to −.042. The estimated effect of the current mini-
mum wage is negative but statistically insignificant. Finally, in the less developed West,
although the estimated coefficients are relatively larger, we do not find a statistically
significant effect of the minimum wage on employment. Therefore, we don’t report the
estimates for the West here and leave the discussion of the result in Section 4.4.4.2 Gender and age cohort
A large number of international studies of minimum wages have reported that young
workers are most vulnerable to minimum wage increases, and the disemployment effect
seems especially strong for teenagers. Female workers are particularly disadvantaged in
the labor market. We therefore separate the sample into four age subgroups: 15–29,
30–39, 40–49, and 50–64.25 In each age group, we estimate Eq. (2) of the fixed-effects
model separately for males and females and report the results in Table 6.
Consistent with most studies in the literature, we find that the minimum wage has
strong negative effects on young female workers (age 15–29)—the most disadvantaged
and vulnerable groups in the labor market. In contrast, we do not find significant
effects on the employment of young male workers (age 15–29) and older workers (age
50–64) in the full sample.4.3 Skill level
In the extant literature, the bulk of evidence supports the view that minimum wages
reduce the employment of low-wage workers. Moreover, when researchers focus on the
least-skilled groups, which are most likely to be directly affected by minimum wage
Table 6 Estimates of minimum wage effects on employment by age cohort
Dependent variable: log
(Employment/Population)
Age 15–29 Age 30–39 Age 40–49 Age 50–64
Independent variables (log) Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
A. All Regions
MW, current year –.031 –.148*** –.019 –.068*** .017 –.040 .009 .023
(.047) (.047) (.027) (.025) (.016) (.027) (.053) (.056)
MW, lagged 1 year –.027 –.061** –.031 –.034 –.015 –.040** –.009 –.023
(.029) (.030) (.019) (.021) (.013) (.017) (.032) (.034)
MW, sum current and lagged –.058 –.210*** –.050 –.102*** –.003 –.080** –.000 –.000
(.053) (.050) (.039) (.027) (.024) (.025) (.072) (.073)
Minimum–to–average wage ratio .388 .442 .266 .353 .252 .362 .260 .403
MW (level) effects on wages .433*** .442*** .442*** .356*** .345*** .239*** .498*** .368**
(.126) (.117) (.071) (.078) (.071) (.086) (.082) (.156)
R2 .173 .169 .022 .097 .012 .093 .052 .055
Number of counties per year 632 626 654 653 655 653 653 598
Average obs. per county per year 113 114 253 260 309 272 231 100
B. East
MW, current year –.103 –.172** –.023 –.098*** –.001 –.043 .022 –.057
(.112) (.076) (.022) (.033) (.017) (.032) (.042) (.061)
MW, lagged 1 year –.012 –.040 –.010 .007 –.016 –.021 –.018 –.001
(.049) (.046) (.011) (.024) (.013) (.025) (.031) (.041)
MW, sum current and lagged –.116 –.212*** –.033 –.091*** –.016 –.064** .004 –.059
(.136) (.071) (.021) (.033) (.018) (.029) (.042) (.067)
Minimum–to–average wage ratio .353 .415 .247 .344 .240 .367 .245 .424
MW (level) effects on wages .999*** .895*** .664*** .393*** .196 .256 .252 .442
(.186) (.194) (.118) (.127) (.125) (.158) (.147) (.324)
R2 .176 .195 .049 .094 .013 .092 .039 .094
Number of counties per year 280 280 285 287 288 285 286 269
Average obs. per county per year 131 144 299 308 337 302 266 108
C. Central
MW, current year .014 –.155** –.052** –.087** .013 .034 .025 .152**
(.062) (.068) (.020) (.040) (.023) (.062) (.085) (.075)
MW, lagged 1 year –.014 –.066 –.072*** –.071** –.018 –.013 .021 –.024
(.068) (.044) (.020) (.036) (.022) (.029) (.052) (.047)
MW, sum current and lagged –.001 –.220*** –.123*** –.158*** –.006 .021 .047 .128
(.082) (.077) (.024) (.051) (.039) (.077) (.124) (.092)
Minimum–to–average wage ratio .433 .482 .278 .360 .256 .354 .264 .368
MW (level) effects on wages .425* .114* .295*** .311*** .290*** .260** .346 .500***
(.222) (.068) (.092) (.109) (.096) (.123) (.239) (.125)
R2 .123 .114 .076 .148 .015 .057 .044 .089
Number of counties per year 265 260 276 273 275 277 276 246
Average obs. per county per year 87 94 211 212 276 235 186 95
D. West
MW, current year –.071 –.145 .231* .078 .093 –.018 –.394** –.400***
(.170) (.109) (.123) (.078) (.080) (.111) (.188) (.120)
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Table 6 Estimates of minimum wage effects on employment by age cohort (Continued)
MW, lagged 1 year –.121 –.215* .117** –.103** .004 .066 –.136 –.037
(.124) (.110) (.053) (.046) (.053) (.072) (.139) (.093)
MW, sum current and lagged –.192 –.360* .348** –.026 .097 .048 –.530* –.437**
(.180) (.187) (.166) (.091) (.116) (.156) (.283) (.178)
Minimum–to–average wage ratio .451 .470 .310 .370 .290 .362 .313 .389
MW (level) effects on wages .610 .511** .624 .553** .399 .442 .388*** .217***
(.893) (.246) (.482) (.269) (.520) (.549) (.133) (.048)
R2 .172 .179 .236 .152 .102 .085 .091 .269
Number of counties per year 87 86 93 93 92 91 91 93
Average obs. per county per year 101 107 237 255 316 288 253 107
Cluster–robust standard errors at the county level are in parentheses. All variables in the table are at the county level,
except that CPI is at the city level. Each estimation has controlled for year and county fixed effects as well as other
control variables as described in Section 3.2. In each panel, the estimates of MW effects on wages are taken from
Additional file 1: Table S1
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **at the 5 percent level; *at the 10 percent level
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(Neumark and Wascher 2008). We present the estimation results by three skill groups
as measured by educational attainment in Table 7. In each group, we report the
estimates using the fixed-effects model with both fixed year and county effects. Our
results show that minimum wages reduce the employment of low-skilled workers,
indicating that Chinese workers who have high school education or less, and those who
have vocational school degrees were adversely affected by minimum wage increases.26
In contrast, we do not find an effect of minimum wages on workers with a college
degree or above (including junior college).4.4 Discussion of the results
We began with estimating the employment effects of minimum wages by three
geographical regions and sought to explain the impact for the 2004–2009 period. The
estimates showed that in the more developed East China, the negative employment
effects of the current and lagged minimum wages on young adults are statistically
significant, with elasticities in the range of −.088 and −.136 to −.156, respectively.
Although the numbers are small, they are in the range of those found in the studies of
developed and developing countries, and are very likely inside of the consensus range
of −.1 to −.3 from the earlier literature as noted in Neumark and Wascher (2008).
Moreover, we find that minimum wage changes result in a larger lagged disemploy-
ment effect for at-risk groups across the country, with elasticities ranging from −.265
to −.340. In particular, these effects are consistently more pronounced for both young
adults and at-risk groups in the Central region. The fact that nearly all the lagged
effects are uniformly more pronounced than the current contemporaneous effects for
young adults and at-risk groups highlights the importance of the adjustment period
through which the disemployment effects would occur. It is worth noting that our find-
ing of a lagged disemployment effect is not an anomaly among the empirical studies in
the extant minimum wage literature. Hamermesh (1995) points out that nonlabor
inputs such as capital may be costly and slow to adjust in the short run, which will also
tend to slow the adjustment of other complementary inputs such as labor. Subsequent
Table 7 Estimates of minimum wage effects on employment by educational attainment
Dependent variable: log
(Employment/Population)
High school or below Vocational school Junior college College or above
Independent variables (log) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
A. All Regions
MW, current year –.080** –.054** –.037 –.046* –.018 –.023 –.006 –.013
(.040) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.020) (.020) (.013) (.014)
MW, lagged 1 year –.019 –.029 –.040** –.047** –.002 –.016 –.005 –.019
(.020) (.018) (.020) (.020) (.021) (.021) (.015) (.015)
MW, sum current and lagged –.099*** –.083*** –.077*** –.092*** –.020 –.039 –.011 –.032
(.030) (.029) (.027) (.027) (.018) (.024) (.015) (.021)
MW (level) effects on wages .541*** .326*** .560*** .391*** .056 .053 .157* .187
(.056) (.066) (.072) (.078) (.084) (.088) (.095) (.119)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .046 .076 .036 .068 .044 .079 .003 .032
Number of counties per year 659 659 636 636 653 653 632 632
Average obs. per county per year 744 744 196 196 408 408 277 277
B. East
MW, current year –.070* –.061 –.049 –.054 –.048 –.064 –.031 –.032
(.038) (.041) (.046) (.047) (.037) (.040) (.020) (.020)
MW, lagged 1 year –.025 –.017 –.003 –.006 .028 .018 –.039 –.039
(.023) (.024) (.028) (.030) (.027) (.028) (.027) (.027)
MW, sum current and lagged –.095*** –.079* –.052 –.060 .020 –.046 –.069 –.072
(.036) (.043) (.054) (.054) (.021) (.035) (.045) (.058)
MW (level) effects on wages .720*** .300*** .619*** .419*** .044 .005 .335 .346
(.087) (.110) (.110) (.143) (.186) (.182) (.258) (.254)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .056 .062 .028 .036 .053 .091 .011 .032
Number of counties per year 289 289 281 281 286 286 284 284
Average obs. per county per year 819 819 224 224 476 476 355 355
C. Central
MW, current year –.071** –.077** –.048 –.051 .012 .007 .074 .077
(.034) (.035) (.037) (.037) (.023) (.023) (.056) (.057)
MW, lagged 1 year –.052** –.047* –.083*** –.090*** –.030 –.033 .080 .079
(.025) (.025) (.032) (.033) (.033) (.034) (.038) (.038)
MW, sum current and lagged –.123*** –.124*** –.131*** –.141*** –.018 –.026 .155 .157
(.043) (.043) (.040) (.040) (.034) (.035) (.107) (.109)
MW (level) effects on wages .391*** .326*** .434*** .409*** .024 .070 .016 .051
(.084) (.091) (.107) (.107) (.105) (.118) (.130) (.143)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .083 .111 .073 .094 .045 .082 .045 .046
Number of counties per year 277 277 263 263 274 274 259 259
Average obs. per county per year 650 650 170 170 341 341 197 197
D. West
MW, current year –.184 –.030 –.019 .012 –.068 –.034 .033 .112
(.163) (.092) (.073) (.086) (.062) (.060) (.084) (.103)
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Table 7 Estimates of minimum wage effects on employment by educational attainment
(Continued)
MW, lagged 1 year .154 –.037 –.046 –.031 .020 –.021 –.020 –.054
(.120) (.092) (.090) (.089) (.078) (.072) (.070) (.062)
MW, sum current and lagged –.031 –.068 –.065 –.019 –.048 –.055 .013 .058
(.120) (.092) (.104) (.111) (.081) (.097) (.106) (.138)
MW (level) effects on wages .365 .060 .436 .605 .424 .232 .498 .343
(.348) (.461) (.398) (.607) (.294) (.411) (.386) (.451)
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .013 .059 .028 .052 .017 .099 .019 .080
Number of counties per year 93 93 92 92 93 93 89 89
Average obs. per county per year 791 791 183 183 394 394 258 258
Cluster–robust standard errors at the county level are in parentheses. All variables in the table are at county level. All
variables in the table are at the county level, except that CPI is at the city level. Each estimation has controlled for year
and county fixed effects. In each panel, the estimates of MW effects on wages are taken from Additional file 1: Table S2
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **at the 5 percent level; *at the 10 percent level
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minimum wages: for example, Baker et al. (1999) based on Canadian data, Keil et al.
(2001) based on a panel of U.S. state-based data, Burkhauser et al. (2000) based on
Current Population Survey data, and Wang and Gunderson (2011) based on a Chinese
provincial-level panel data.
Our full sample results (age 15–64) reported in column 3 of Table 5 show negative
employment effects across the country and in the Eastern region, which is consistent
with the findings by Ni et al. (2011), who used general working population (age 15 and
above) in their analysis. When focusing on young adults and at-risk groups (which are
more likely to be affected by the minimum wage policy), we found stronger disemploy-
ment effects in the East, lagged disemployment effects in the Central, and positive
while insignificant effects in the Western region. The differential disemployment effects
across regions can be explained in part by the fact that in the Central and Western regions
young adults and at-risk groups tend to work in the state-owned enterprises—a sector
that is considerably inefficient and less responsive to market pressures (Lin et al. 2001).27
Taken together, our results show heterogeneous employment effects of minimum
wages by region, skill, and gender.28 In particular, the effect on young adults and at-risk
groups varies, highlighting the importance of heterogeneous effects of minimum wages
by the characteristics of those affected.294.5 Robustness checks
4.5.1 Normalized minimum wage
In their influential works, Neumark and Wascher (1992); Card et al. (1994) discuss the po-
tential endogeneity issue when normalizing the minimum wage by the average wage which
we use in our analysis. The main concern of using a normalized minimum wage variable is
that average wages can be related to supply and demand factors (which also affect youth em-
ployment) and are affected by minimum wage changes. That is, if wages increase more slowly
in places where employment grows more slowly, one could possibly find a negative relation-
ship between normalized minimum wages and employment even when the minimum wage
does not increase.
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control for average wages of groups that are not being examined in the regression as an
additional covariate (e.g., in the young adults regressions, we use the average wage of
non-young adults as an additional control) and show those results in Table 8. Overall,
we find that our results are robust whether or not the minimum wages are normalized.
That is, we still find statistically significant disemployment effects in the East, Central
and all regions for young adults, at-risk groups, and for the entire sample. And we do
not find any effect in the Western region.
4.5.2 Representativeness of the sample
The fact that the NBS only allows limited access to the microdata up to 16 provinces
could cast doubt on the representativeness of the 16-province UHS sample to the entire
population. To address this concern, we utilize the 2005 Census data to compare
descriptive statistics of the 16 sample provinces with the 15 provinces not in our
sample, along with the entire census sample.
We check the representativeness of our 16 sample provinces by comparing the
descriptive statistics of the UHS with those of the 2005 Census and report the compari-
sons in Table 9. We also compute the two key variables—minimum wage-to-average
wage ratio and employment-to-population ratio—by gender, region, age cohort, and
educational attainment for all provinces, 16 provinces in our sample, and 15 provinces
not in our sample. The numbers for all provinces and 16 provinces are relatively close
to those of 15 provinces not in the sample. In other words, Table 9 provides evidence
that our 16-province UHS sample is representative of the whole country.5 Conclusions
We use a large county-level panel dataset that contains relevant information on mini-
mum wages, combined with urban household survey microdata from 16 representative
provinces, to estimate the employment effect of minimum wage changes in China over
the 2004–2009 period. Compared to previous studies using provincial-level data and
reporting mixed results, we find that minimum wage changes in China led to signifi-
cant negative effects on the employment in the Eastern and Central regions, and caused
disemployment for young adults and low-skilled workers, particularly at-risk groups.
Our study makes a number of significant contributions to the empirical literature on
minimum wages in China, the largest transitional economy in the world. First, the use
of detailed county-level data (over 1,400 counties) provides greater accuracy and more
variations (127 changes) of minimum wages in order to measure their real impact on
employment. Second, the unique features of the UHS microdata allow us to directly
evaluate the employment effects of minimum wages on those population groups that
are at risk of being affected by minimum wage increases, such as young adults and
low-skilled workers. Third, our results are robust to various definitions of minimum
wages and the workforce, various subsamples by region, and across a number of popu-
lation groups. Fourth, minimum wages were strongly enforced after the new Minimum
Wage Regulations were enacted in 2004, as such they are expected to have more
significant employment effects after 2004. Our results show that minimum wages in
the provinces with vigorous enforcement did increase wages of the workers while




Young adults (Age 15–29) At–risk group Entire sample
Independent variables (log) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
A. All Regions
MW level, current year –.120* –.005 –.093 –.263* –.009 –.018**
(.072) (.082) (.084) (.158) (.017) (.010)
MW level, lagged 1 year –.228*** –.060*** –.047** –.268*** .016* –.024**
(.077) (.028) (.024) (.102) (.009) (.013)
MW, sum current and lagged –.348*** –.065*** –.140* –.531*** .007 –.039***
(.075) (.032) (.071) (.121) (.010) (.011)
Mean wagesa No Yes No Yes No Yes
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .070 .202 .008 .025 .026 .101
Number of counties per year 649 649 562 562 661 661
Average obs. per county per year 270 270 170 170 1658 1658
B. East
MW level, current year –.198*** –.170** –.050 –.073 –.047* –.026***
(.101) (.090) (.161) (.274) (.028) (.013)
MW level, lagged 1 year –.150** –.171 –.114* –.206*** –.026 –.025
(.081) (.124) (.068) (.102) (.031) (.031)
MW, sum current and lagged –.348* –.341* –.164** –.279*** –.073** –.051***
(.187) (.179) (.079) (.112) (.036) (.021)
Mean wagesa No Yes No Yes No Yes
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .080 .221 .017 .046 .084 .093
Number of counties per year 286 286 253 253 289 289
Average obs. per county per year 329 329 180 180 1917 1917
C. Central
MW level, current year –.054 –.056 –.043 –.023 –.038 –.033
(.125) (.142) (.124) (.173) (.030) (.035)
MW level, lagged 1 year –.126* –.234* –.067 –.248*** –.032* –.046***
(.075) (.126) (.114) (.119) (.017) (.018)
MW, sum current and lagged –.180* –.290** –.110 –.271** –.070*** –.079***
(.091) (.140) (.109) (.124) (.027) (.025)
Mean wagesa No Yes No Yes No Yes
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .067 .126 .018 .050 .031 .122
Number of counties per year 273 273 230 230 279 279
Average obs. per county per year 214 214 154 154 1385 1385
D. West
MW level, current year .021 –.117 .114 .144 –.042 –.166
(.118) (.186) (.599) (.536) (.365) (.244)
MW level, lagged 1 year .176 .510 –.026 –.178 –.021 –.347
(.520) (.662) (.434) (.534) (.183) (.238)
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Table 8 Estimates of minimum wage effects on the employment (Non–normalized minimum
wage variable) (Continued)
MW, sum current and lagged .197 .393 .088 –.034 –.063 –.513
(.476) (.581) (.536) (.534) (.270) (.340)
Mean wagesa No Yes No Yes No Yes
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 .058 .168 .030 .076 .059 .160
Number of counties per year 90 90 79 79 93 93
Average obs. per county per year 250 250 181 181 1673 1673
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **at the 5 percent level; *at the 10 percent level
aThe control variables for the mean wage of young adults and at risk groups are mean wages of non–young adults and
non–at risk groups, respectively. The control variable for mean wage of the entire sample is the mean wage of the entire
sample. Each estimation has controlled for year and county fixed effects
Cluster–robust standard errors at the county level are in parentheses
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workers.
Endnotes
1Nevertheless, these two positions are not necessarily in conflict. The minimum wage
can have negative impacts but also serve those other goals advocated by its supporters.
The existing evidence has shown that the minimum wage poses a tradeoff of higher
income for some against job losses for others.
2There is no national minimum wage in China; rather, the minimum wage standards
are determined at the provincial level. We discuss how we calculate the mean nominal
minimum wages of each year in Section 3.1.
3The growth rates of average nominal wage are 155 and 194% for the periods of
1995–2003 and 2004–2012, respectively.
4The theoretically expected effect of minimum wages on employment is well
established in the literature. For examples, see reviews in Card and Krueger (1995);
Brown (1999); Gunderson (2005); Cunningham (2007); Neumark and Wascher (2008).
However, there is no consensus in the existing empirical studies on the magnitude of
disemployment effect associated with minimum wage changes. Please refer to Neumark
and Wascher (2007) for the most extensive survey of employment effects; Card (1992);
Card and Krueger (1994, 1995, 2000); Neumark and Wascher (1992, 1995); Williams
(1993) for U.S. evidence; Machin and Manning (1994); Dickens et al. (1999); Stewart
(2004); Metcalf (2008) for British evidence; Campolieti et al. (2005); Campolieti et al.
(2006) for Canadian evidence.
5For expositional convenience, we refer to “provinces, municipalities, and autonomous
regions” as provinces.
6The implementation date of a new minimum wage standard for a county can also differ
across geographically contiguous neighbors within the same province. For example, Liaoning
Province has the most complicated minimum wage scheme, in which 14 jurisdictions may
enact their own standards on different dates. For instance, in 2007, Shenyang, Benxi,
Dandong, and Panjin cities did not increase their minimum wages. In contrast, Dalian and
Anshan cities increased their minimum wages from 600 to 700 RMB on December 20th, on
which day Jinzhou and Liaoyang cities increased their minimum wages from 480 to 580
RMB and Chaoyang city increased its minimum wage from 350 to 530 RMB. Furthermore,
Table 9 Representativeness of the 16-province sample: summary statistics, 2005 census














All .388 .371 .425 .779 .783 .773
(1.081) (.087) (.098) (.087) (.082) (.093)
Gender
Male .361 .347 .398 .849 .852 .841
(.082) (.074) (.089) (.068) (.058) (.079)
Female .432 .421 .470 .711 .719 .696
(.098) (.088) (.102) (.081) (.074) (.092)
Region
East .373 380 .461 .824 .841 .799
(.067) (.069) (.100) (.077) (.072) (.087)
Central .410 .413 .400 .757 .764 .736
(.083) (.073) (.099) (.079) (.073) (.092)
West .406 .410 .403 .759 .763 .751
(.103) (.121) (.102) (.093) (.090) (.096)
Age cohort
Age 15–29 .421 .411 .474 .487 .502 .434
Age 30–39 .370 .352 .409 .850 .874 .802
Age 40–49 .377 .363 .403 .867 .887 .832




.463 .455 .490 .775 .779 .767
Junior college .288 .267 .337 .824 .824 .825
College or above .189 .167 .257 .877 .877 .878
Observations 1,687,919 1,084,190 603,729 1,687,919 1,084,190 603,729
Standard deviations are in parentheses. The 16 provinces include Liaoning, Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai,
Guangdong, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi, Gansu, Chongqing, Sichuan, and Yunnan
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ary 1st, whereas that of Yingkou city increased from 380 to 480 RMB, that of Fuxin city in-
creased from 350 to 420 RMB, and that of Tieling city increased from 380 to 420 RMB the
following year. As such detailed minimum wage data by county are not readily available to
the public, we took effort to collect the data by ourselves.
7We are aware that possible endogeneity of minimum wages may bias our results,
especially in China the minimum wage standards are set by provincial governments,
labor unions, and employer groups. Neumark and Wascher (2004) argue that the
earlier evidence from Wages Councils in the UK (which did not find disemployment
effects) is likely not true because a minimum wage is not enacted when the labor
market is in trouble, which may lead us to expect fewer adverse effects. But, as will be
shown in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we find clear evidence that minimum wages in China
have resulted in disemployment for the less skilled workers, women, and young adults;
and conversely we do not find disemplyment effects for the more skilled and prime age
workers. Such falsification test helps rule out the endogeneity issue unless we believe
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shocks on less skilled labor markets only. In addition, our finding of strong wage effects
for the less skilled worker, women, and young adults also helps dismiss such kind of
endogeneity concern. Similarly, our falsification test also helps reduce the concern
raised by Dube et al. (2010); Allegretto et al. (2011) that high-wage industries also
experienced lower job growth after minimum wage increases, which is spurious.
8In other words, depending on whether one accounts for this issue, the difference can
be substantial. For instance, the mean monthly minimum wages in Beijing and Shanghai
were 651 and 767 RMB in 2004–2009; however, the average expenses of both social secur-
ity payments and housing provident funds in Beijing and Shanghai are as high as 376 and
452 RMB over the same period, amounting to 58 and 59% of the nominal minimum
wages, respectively. We discuss how we address this issue in the Section 3.1.
9There are 31 administrative units at the provincial level in China, including 22
provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 4 municipalities; as of 2012, there are 2,862
county-level administrative units.
10Although we do not report the results of migrant workers in the paper, they are
available upon request.
11This has affected compliance significantly. According to our calculation using
2002–2009 data, nationwide the share of workers who earn less than the minimum
wage declined continuously, falling from 7.28 to 5.62% in the pre- and post-2004
periods (2002–2003, 2004–2009), respectively. In particular, the number decreased
from 8.08 to 5.33% in the Eastern region between the same periods; whereas in the
Central region, the number decreased from 6.19 to 5.46%.
12We have also calculated three violation indices introduced in Bhorat et al. (2013)
which has the form of Vα = E{[(mw −w)/mw]
α}, where w denotes wage, mw is the
relevant minimum wage, α is the index that concerns the depth of violation, and E is
the expectation operator. As α increases, there is more weight on greater violations.
We use α = 0, 1, and 2 to represent the standard, the depth, and the severity measures
of violation, respectively. In addition, we also compute the ratio V1/V0 as the percent-
age shortfall of the average wage of violated workers from the minimum wage. Take all
regions over the 2004–2009 period for example, the estimates for V0 and V1 are .071
and .024, respectively. The V1/V0 ratio is .338, indicating that non-complying employers
paid wages that were on average 34 percent short of the legislative minima. Overall, the
results are consistent to the descriptive statistics in Table 3 and the results using the
enforcement variable. We find that all indices show the violation decreases over time in
the Eastern and Central regions of China, especially after 2004; while the Western
region has relatively higher violation. The results are available upon request.
13Note that the UHS is not publicly available. The NBS allows limited access to the microdata
up to 16 provinces under certain conditions for academic research. Despite that, the 16-
province sample includes most economically important provinces in China. To check the repre-
sentativeness of our 16-province UHS sample, we use the 2005 Census to compare descriptive
statistics of the 16 sample provinces with the 15 provinces not in the sample. We discuss and
show that the 16 sample provinces are quantitatively similar to all provinces in Section 4.5.2.
14In the original data, we are able to identify how many months a person works and
record his/her monthly income and wages in a year. From 2002 to 2009, on average,
91 % of the workers have worked for 12 months in a year.
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Recession.
16For example, if the minimum wage adjustment in a particular county and a particu-
lar year took place on September 1, the mean minimum wage for that year and county
is an average of the old and the new minimum wages, weighted by three-fourths and
one-fourths, respectively. This time-weighted average method is used for our study be-
cause the adjustment date varies substantially across county and year in China. It can
be in March, May, July or November (sometimes in January). This method helps reduce
the bias from using all the old or the new minimum wage.
17In fact, the average real minimum wage has also grown at a similar rate. The mean
changes in minimum wage are weighted by county worker population.
18The average annual growth rate of the minimum wage is 12.7% in the Eastern region,
13.2% in the Central region, and 12.5% in the Western region over the 2004–2009 period.
19Note that the minimum wage standards are the same for men and women.
20To assure that we are comparing minimum wage standards on a comparable basis,
the minimum-to-average wage ratios in Table 2 have accounted for the fact that some
provinces include social security payments and housing provident funds as part of the
wage when calculating minimum wages. For example, the minimum wages in Beijing,
Shanghai and Jiangxi do not include social security payments and housing provident
funds, and the minimum wages in Jiangsu began to include only social security pay-
ments (but not housing provident funds) on November 1st, 2005.
21Our estimate of few full-time workers in China earn less than the monthly legal mini-
mum wage is similar to Ye et al. (2014) that use a firm-employee matched data of 6 prov-
inces in China and find the number is between 2.1 and 3.4% in 2009. The other estimate
is by Sun and Shu (2011) who use a dataset of in 9 cities of Guangdong province in 2006,
2008, 2009 and 2010 and find that the proportion of rural-migrant workers who earn less
than the monthly minimum wage in the four years is 9.0, 7.7, 4.0 and 4.2%, respectively.
22Note that Dube et al. (2010); Allegretto et al. (2011) have criticized the state/county
panel-data approach and attempt to construct better counterfactuals for estimating the
effects of minimum wages on employment. However, Neumark et al. (2014) provide
evidence that the methods advocated by the above two studies do not isolate more reli-
able identifying information (or even throw out much useful and potentially valid iden-
tifying information), leading to incorrect conclusions. A recent paper by Meer and
West (2013) who use three separate state panels of administrative employment data
and find that minimum wages reduce net job growth. They show that the disemploy-
ment effects are most pronounced for younger workers and in industries with a higher
proportion of low-wage workers. Although we don’t anticipate the issues raised by
Dube et al. (2010); Allegretto et al. (2011) would undermine our results, further work
would be useful and our data permit researchers to explore additional issues.
23We present the results of the minimum wage effect on wages by age cohort, educa-
tional attainment, and the enforcement of minimum wage effects on wages in Additional
file 1: Tables S1 to S3, respectively.
24We also show results for a high skill group (defined as workers with a college
degree or above) as a placebo test in Section 4.3.
25Because the number of workers aged 15–19 is relatively small in our sample, we
use the group of workers aged 15–29 to represent young workers.
Fang and Lin IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:22 Page 28 of 3026The working population defined in our analysis so far excludes the self-employed.
That is, we focus on wage employees only. However, there are some concerns that by
excluding the self-employed, the estimations may actually capture the effect of mini-
mum wages on the structure of employment (wage versus self-employed) rather than
on the share of people actually working. In response to the concerns, we re-examine
the effects based on a broader definition of workforce by including the self-employed.
Overall, our results are similar to Table 5 in that minimum wage changes result in
statistically significant disemployment effects for young adults, at-risk groups, and the
entire sample in the East, Central, and all regions over the same period of analysis.
Likewise, we do not find any effect in the West. The results are available upon request.
27Over 2004–2009, 42% of young adults work in the state-owned enterprises in the
Eastern region; 59 and 61% of young adults work in the state-owned enterprises in
the Central and Western regions, respectively. For at-risk groups, 24% of them work in
the state-owned enterprises in the Eastern region, while 43 and 47% work in the state-
owned enterprises in the Central and Western regions, respectively.
28It is important to recognize that the UHS is designed to be representative at the
provincial level, not at the county level. Due to random sampling errors, our samples
for some specific counties may be noisy. To address this concern, we re-examine our
main results in Table 5 at the provincial level. Similar to the results at the county level
in Table 5, the provincial level estimations do not alter our findings. Minimum wage
increases continue to have significant disemployment effects on the three groups in the
East, Central and all regions, but no effect in the West.
29Indeed, our sample shows that the three groups are different in terms of employ-
ment type, skill, and wage distribution. Over the period of 2004–2009, less than 3% of
young adults are in at-risk groups in each region. Likewise, less than 3% of at-risk
groups are young adults in each region.
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